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On March 24, 2011, Sotheby’s New York unexpectedly removed its  
showcase lot, the Duryodhana,1 from its Indian & Southeast Asian auction 
scheduled to occur that same day.2 This last-minute adjustment occurred in 
response to a letter received hours earlier from the Secretary General of 
Cambodia’s National Commission for the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), who alleged that the 
sculpture had been illegally removed from Cambodia and asked that Sotheby’s 
delete the lot from the auction.3 One year after Sotheby’s voluntarily pulled 
the lot, the United States government filed a civil forfeiture action in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, United 
States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture.4 By filing this action, 
the U.S. government aimed to take title to the Khmer sculpture and return 
it to Cambodia.5  
United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture is just one 
example of the repatriation requests from foreign countries that auction 
houses in the United States face each year. Some scholars report that 
 
1 See infra Figure 1. 
2 Verified Amended Complaint at 21-22, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone 
Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Verified Amended Complaint]; Ann-
Margret Gidley, Cambodia’s Repatriation Campaign, 13 IFAR J., no. 4, 2012–2013, at 17, 17.  
3 Declaration of Peter G. Neiman in Support of Claimant’s Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 4 at 1, 
United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 
2012) [hereinafter June 5, 2012 Neiman Declaration] (offering as an exhibit a March 24, 2011 letter 
from Tan Theany, Sec’y Gen., Cambodian Nat’l Comm’n for UNESCO, to Sotheby’s N.Y.); see also 
Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 22.  
4 Verified Complaint at 1-2, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculp-
ture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2012). 
5 See PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 674 (3d ed. 2012) (“Civil forfeiture provides a flexible and useful tool for the 
government. . . . Forfeiture transfers title to the government, which, in the case of cultural 
objects, generally returns the object to its original owner.”). 
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countries such as Cambodia have been mounting more repatriation requests 
in recent years.6 Auction houses confronted with these repatriation requests 
must struggle through the ambiguities and deficiencies in the current law 
when deciding how to respond. As an alternative to the available legal 
response to repatriation requests, I propose that auction houses should 
develop a uniform code of ethics to guide their efforts in replying to these 
requests. Auction houses should look to the International Council of 
Museums’ (ICOM) Code of Ethics for Museums7 as a model for fashioning 
their own code of ethics. If all major auction houses voluntarily agree to 
adopt a uniform code of ethics, there would be fewer repatriation requests 
and less uncertainty surrounding compliance with the current complex web 
of laws and regulations that differ from country to country.  
In Part I, I describe the background of the Duryodhana, including how 
the sculpture fits within the Cambodian cultural framework and Cambodian 
perceptions of property and ownership. I also summarize the litigation and 
recent settlement surrounding the sculpture, noting the parties’ principal 
contested points that remain unresolved. In Part II, I outline the current 
legal response for addressing repatriation claims, including its deficiencies. 
In Part III, I propose that auction houses look to museums for guidance in 
order to remedy the unsettled and unsatisfactory state of this legal struc-
ture. By adopting a uniform code of ethics modeled after the ICOM Code 
of Ethics for Museums, auction houses will be better situated to avoid 
repatriation claims. Finally, I conclude by suggesting specific provisions that 
auction houses might adopt as a starting point for developing a uniform 
code of ethics. 
I. SOTHEBY’S INTERRUPTED SALE OF THE KHMER SCULPTURE, 
SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION, AND SETTLEMENT 
A. Background on the Duryodhana, the Khmer Empire, 
and Cambodian Cultural Values 
The Khmer sculpture that is the defendant in rem in United States v. A 
10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture depicts a Hindu warrior called 
 
6 See Robert Bevan, Playing Hardball with Soft Power, ART NEWSPAPER, Oct. 2013, at 26 
(“One factor [in the increase in repatriation requests from countries such as Cambodia, India, and 
China] is the growing awareness of the role that cultural artefacts can play in forging national 
identities. This is especially true where countries are emerging from internal or external conflicts 
and are looking to culture to provide social cement or to legitimate a cohesive future for a nation-state 
based on the relics of past greatness.”). 
7 INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, ICOM CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS (2013), available at 
http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Codes/code_ethics2013_eng.pdf. 
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the Duryodhana.8 The Duryodhana comes from the Prasat Chen temple in 
Koh Ker, an archaeological site located in northern Cambodia.9 Within the 
Prasat Chen temple, the Duryodhana originally stood face-to-face with a 
second sculpture called the Bhima, placed so as to “depict[] [the warriors] at 
the moment of preparation for their epic battle.”10  
Both the Duryodhana and the Bhima were created during Jayavarman 
IV’s rule of the Khmer Empire,11 which lasted from AD 928 to 942.12 At the 
Khmer Empire’s peak, the territory reached “from Burma to Indochina and 
from China to Malaysia.”13 Jayavarman IV, who transferred the Empire’s 
capital from Angkor to Koh Ker, favored grand and elaborate styles of art 
and architecture, which are showcased at Prasat Chen and other temples of 
Koh Ker.14 The Duryodhana, with its limbs poised for action, embodies the 
unique Koh Ker style, which one Phnom Penh-based UNESCO agent has 
admired for its “freedom of sculpting things out of the frame.”15  
 
8 Gidley, supra note 2, at 17-18. The defendant in an in rem action is the sculpture itself. See 
GERSTENBLITH, supra note 5, at 674. Sotheby’s was able to join the in rem proceeding as a 
claimant “with an interest in the property.” Id. 
9 Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
10 Id. at 4; see also infra Figure 2. For a description of the Duryodhana’s original location within 
Prasat Chen, see Anthony Kuhn, Cambodia vs. Sotheby’s in a Battle Over Antiquities, NPR (Oct. 23, 
2012, 1:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/23/163007250/cambodia-vs-sothebys-in-a-battle-over-
antiquities, archived at http://perma.cc/8N9S-JABZ. The Norton Simon Museum in Pasadena, 
California acquired the Bhima in 1976. Press Release, Norton Simon Museum, Statement from the 
Norton Simon Museum and the Norton Simon Art Foundation Concerning the “Temple 
Wrestler” (May 6, 2014), available at http://www.nortonsimon.org/assets/Uploads/Norton-Simon-
MuseumBhima-Press-Release-05-06-14.pdf. Norton Simon Museum officials visited Cambodia 
and, in early May 2014, the Norton Simon announced its decision to return the Bhima, even 
though it maintained that a “good faith disagreement” regarding the sculpture’s ownership and 
Cambodian law still existed. Id. Meanwhile, the auction house Christie’s voluntarily returned a 
Khmer sculpture that it sold to a collector in 2009 and then repurchased with the objective of 
returning it to Cambodia. Tom Mashberg & Ralph Blumenthal, Christie’s To Return Cambodian 
Statue, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, at C1. 
11 Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 3-5; see also IAN MABBET & DAVID CHANDLER, 
THE KHMERS 3 (1995) (explaining that the term “Khmer” denotes “both the language of 
Cambodia and the people who speak it”).  
12 HELEN IBBITSON JESSUP, ART & ARCHITECTURE OF CAMBODIA 89 (2004).  
13 William Chapman, “The Best Laid Schemes . . .”: Land-Use Planning and Historic Preservation 
in Cambodia, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529, 535 (1998). 
14 See JESSUP, supra note 12, at 89-91 (“[T]he huge royal complex of Koh Ker is perhaps the 
embodiment of [Jayavarman IV]’s need to demonstrate great power through large-scale architecture. 
Everything about Koh Ker . . . is on a massive scale.”); see also Tom Mashberg, Cambodia Presses 
U.S. Museums to Relinquish Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2013, at C7 (describing how Chan 
Tani, Cambodia’s Secretary of State, characterized the looting of Koh Ker as “especially crushing 
because its style of statuary exists nowhere else”). 
15 Kuhn, supra note 10. 
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To more fully understand the significance of the Duryodhana to the history 
of cultural property in Cambodia, it is important to note the distinct aspects 
of Cambodian constructs of culture and art. The Cambodian culture’s values 
of hierarchy, collective heritage, and ancestry have influenced the country’s 
art and architecture. 16  More specifically, art and architecture from the 
Khmer Empire were designed to reflect the empire’s “‘glorious’ and ‘pros-
perous’ period.”17 Thus, references to the glorious Khmer Era strongly 
influence Cambodia’s cultural identity today.18 Although Cambodian culture 
has always placed great value on ancestry and ties to the past, the country 
did not issue many repatriation claims until recent years,19 when its political 
situation stabilized after the Khmer Rouge era and the Second Civil War.20 
As Cambodia’s Prince Ravivaddhana Sisowath has admitted, “the preserva-
tion of ancient things is not part of [Cambodia’s] traditional culture,” and it 
was only after the designation of Angkor as a World Heritage site in 1995 
that “a deeper consciousness developed among the people of Cambodia, who 
began to take pride in their antiquities.”21 The combination of a deeper 
consciousness regarding Cambodia’s patrimony22 and the stabilization of the 
country’s political situation has contributed to a rise in repatriation  
requests, such as the request issued to Sotheby’s.  
B. Sotheby’s March 2011 Auction 
Sotheby’s planned to auction the Duryodhana as the centerpiece of its 
March 2011 Indian & Southeast Asian auction. In 2010, Ms. Decia Ruspoli, 
a Belgian widow whose late husband bought the Duryodhana from a London 
 
16 Keiko Miura, From Property to Heritage: Different Notions, Rules of Ownership and Practices of 
New and Old Actors in the Angkor World Heritage Site, in WORLD HERITAGE ANGKOR AND 
BEYOND: CIRCUMSTANCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF UNESCO LISTINGS IN CAMBODIA 97, 
101-07 (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin ed., 2011). 
17 Aditya Eggert, A Cambodian “Leitkultur”? Cambodian Concepts of Art & Culture, in WORLD 
HERITAGE ANGKOR AND BEYOND: CIRCUMSTANCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF UNESCO 
LISTINGS IN CAMBODIA, supra note 16, at 73, 75, 77. 
18 Id. 
19 Bevan, supra note 6, at 26. 
20 See generally JUSTIN CORFIELD, THE HISTORY OF CAMBODIA (2009). 
21 Noah Charney, “Preserving Patrimony”: Prince Ravivaddhana Sisowath on the Heritage of Cambo-
dian Art, BLOUIN ARTINFO (Dec. 26, 2012, 1:06 AM), http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news/story/ 
846970/preserving-patrimony-prince-ravivaddhana-sisowath-on-the, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
3DR4-E2FX. 
22 For further analysis of the evolution of the public perception of repatriation requests, see 
Abby Seiff, How Countries Are Successfully Using the Law to Get Looted Cultural Treasures Back, ABA J. 
(July 1, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_countries_are_succesfully_ 
using_the_law_to_get_looted_cultural_treasur, archived at http://perma.cc/6N2X-YFET. 
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auction house in 1975, consigned the sculpture to Sotheby’s.23 Sotheby’s 
considered the Duryodhana to be so impressive that it featured the sculpture 
on the cover of the auction catalogue.24 The catalogue entry, which listed the 
estimated hammer price at $2-3 million, described the sculpture as one of 
the “great masterpieces of Khmer art, unequaled by image from any other 
period in [its] portrayal of drama and potential action.” 25  Cambodia’s 
repatriation request interrupted the potential sale of the Duryodhana, and 
the U.S. government eventually filed a civil forfeiture action against the 
defendant in rem.26 Sotheby’s joined the suit as a claimant per the terms of 
its consignment agreement with Ms. Ruspoli.27 
C. Ensuing Litigation 
In its Verified Amended Complaint, the United States offered three 
main allegations surrounding the Duryodhana. First, the government alleged 
that the sculpture was looted from Prasat Chen in 1972 by a Thai network 
that transported the sculpture in two pieces (the head and the torso) to a 
dealer in Bangkok, who then sold the sculpture to a collector.28 Second, the 
government alleged that the collector consigned the Duryodhana to a British 
auction house, which knew that the sculpture had been stolen when it sold it 
to the Ruspolis in 1975.29 Finally, the government alleged that Sotheby’s 
made inaccurate representations about the Duryodhana’s provenance when it 
attempted to sell the sculpture at auction in 2011.30 
One of the principal disputed points between the parties, left unresolved 
by the settlement, is whether Cambodian law effective at the time of the 
sculpture’s removal from the country actually confers ownership of the 
sculpture on the Cambodian government or whether the law merely func-
tions as a classification order.31 If the former is true, then the United States 
would have had a greater chance of successfully invoking the provisions of 
 
23 Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 9-11 (describing Sotheby’s acquisition of the 
sculpture). 
24 Id. at 20-21. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1. 
27 Id. at 11-12; David L. Hall, Partner, Wiggin & Dana LLP, Remarks at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School Art, Cultural Heritage & the Law Seminar (Oct. 30, 2013) (notes on file 
with author).  
28 Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 8. 
29 Id. at 8-9. 
30 Id. at 22-23. 
31 See infra Section II.F. 
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the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) had the case not settled.32 If the 
latter is true, by contrast, the government would have had a much more 
difficult time convincing the court to grant the forfeiture.33  
According to the claimants, Cambodian law did not explicitly claim  
national ownership of antiquities until 1992.34 The Cambodian government, 
on the other hand, alleged that French colonial decrees from 190035 and 
192536 are ownership laws, which would mean that the sculpture was gov-
ernment property when it left Cambodia.  
After filing their Joint Answer in May 2013, Sotheby’s and Ms. Ruspoli 
filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and a Stay of Discovery in 
September 2013.37 As part of this motion, the claimants included an affidavit 
from Professor Alexandre Deroche, a French law professor with expertise in 
property law that governed French colonies,38 whom the claimants retained 
to provide opinions on the 1900 and 1925 decrees pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 44.1.39 The claimants relied upon Professor Deroche’s 
 
32 See infra Section II.F. 
33 See infra Section II.F. 
34 See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Claimants’ Sotheby’s Inc. & Ms. Ruspoli di 
Poggio Suasa’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone 
Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012) (describing Cambodia’s enactment of a 1992 law 
making cultural patrimonies property of the state); see also Declaration of Peter G. Neiman in 
Support of Claimants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 2 
at 1, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 17, 2012) (noting that Article 4 of the 1992 law explicitly states that “[t]he mineral, cultural 
and historical patrimonies underground, on the ground . . . are property of this state”). 
35 Arrêté du 9 mars 1900 relatif à conservation en Indochine des monuments et objets ayant un 
intérêt historique ou artistique [Decree of March 9, 1900 Relating to Conservation in Indochina of 
Monuments and Objects of Historical or Artistic Interest], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE L’INDOCHINE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRENCH INDOCHINA], 1900, p. 502; June 5, 2012 Neiman 
Declaration, supra note 3, Ex. 8 at 6 (translating Article 17 of the March 9, 1900 order as stating that 
“ownership of art or archaeological objects . . . which may exist on or in the soil of immovable 
properties constituting a part of the national domain in Indochina . . . shall be reserved for the 
domain”). 
36 E.g., Arrêté du 16 mai 1925 portant classement des monuments historiques de l’Indochine 
[Decree of May 16, 1925 on the Classification of the Historical Monuments of Indochina] 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE L’INDOCHINE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRENCH 
INDOCHINA], 1925, p. 1754; see also Declaration of Prof. Alexandre Deroche at 7, United States v. 
A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013) (translat-
ing Article 1 of the May 16, 1925 order as stating that “[t]he real estate and tangible moveable 
items located within the territorial limits of the Indochinese Union . . . are classified among the 
monuments and historic objects of French Indochina”). 
37 Memorandum of Law in Support of Claimants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings & 
for a Stay of Discovery, United States v. A 10th Century Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Sept. 9, 2013 Memorandum of Law]. 
38 Id. at 2.  
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant 
material or source, including testimony . . . .”).  
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affidavit to argue that the 1925 decree is a classification order.40 The claimants 
asserted Professor Deroche’s position that the phrase “of French Indochina” 
in the 1925 decree signifies that the property is “located in” French Indochina 
rather than “belonging to” French Indochina, as the U.S. government 
interpreted the phrase.41 
In addition to the issue regarding the ownership laws, other points of 
contention between the parties included (1) the date on which the sculpture 
actually left Cambodia,42 (2) whether Sotheby’s knew that the sculpture was 
stolen, 43  and (3) whether Cambodia had enforced the French colonial 
decrees in the past.44  
D. A Politically Motivated Dispute? 
Another significant aspect of the litigation is that, based on the facts of 
the case and the applicable law,45 there is a question as to whether political 
motives contributed to the United States’ decision to initiate this lawsuit. 
During litigation, the claimants revealed that Sotheby’s and the Cambodian 
government had been involved in negotiating a settlement, which fell apart 
 
40 See Sept. 9, 2013 Memorandum of Law, supra note 37, at 20-21 (“[T]he 16 May [1925] order 
is a classification order . . . .”).  
41 Id. at 20-21; see also Declaration of Prof. Alexandre Deroche, supra note 36, at 7-9 (explaining 
that the language of the 1925 order describes geographic location rather than asserts ownership).  
42 The United States claimed that the sculpture was looted “[i]n or around” 1972, see Verified 
Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 8, whereas Sotheby’s claimed that it had “located two 
individuals (neither of whom have any financial interest in the property) both of whom personally 
saw the Sculpture in London in the late 1960’s,” Declaration of Peter G. Neiman in Support of 
Claimants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings & for a Stay of Discovery, Ex. 4 at 3, United 
States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2013) 
[hereinafter Sept. 9, 2013 Neiman Declaration] (offering as an exhibit a March 30, 2011 letter from 
Jane A. Levine, Senior Vice President & Worldwide Dir. of Compliance, Sotheby’s, to Anne 
Lemaistre, UNESCO Rep., Cambodia). The government’s claim that the statue was looted “[i]n 
or around” 1972 is significant because Cambodia ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 1972. 
See Joint Answer of Claimants Sotheby’s, Inc. & Ms. Decia Ruspoli di Poggio Suasa at 10, United 
States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013) 
[hereinafter Joint Answer of Claimants] (admitting that Cambodia ratified the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property on September 26, 1972). 
43 Compare Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 22 (alleging that “Sotheby’s provided 
inaccurate information regarding its provenance to numerous parties”), with Joint Answer of 
Claimants, supra note 42, at 8 (denying this allegation).  
44 Compare Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 27 (alleging that “in 1924 two 
Frenchmen . . . were prosecuted and convicted for theft for taking eleven sculptures from a 
temple in the Angkor region”), with Joint Answer of Claimants, supra note 42, at 10-11 (alleging 
that Cambodia had neither previously sought the return of objects similar to the statue nor “relied 
upon the legal theory or French colonial decrees discussed in the Verified Amended Complaint”).  
45 See infra Section II. 
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at the urging of the U.S. government.46 After the Secretary General of 
Cambodia’s National Commission for UNESCO sent a letter to Sotheby’s 
requesting that it remove the Duryodhana from auction, Sotheby’s responded 
in May 2011 with three potential suggestions for future action: (1) Sotheby’s 
could put the Duryodhana up for public auction again that upcoming fall and 
donate a share of the proceeds to conservation initiatives at Koh Ker; (2) 
either a private individual or the Cambodian government could purchase 
the Duryodhana through a private sale, after which the purchaser would 
repatriate the sculpture to Cambodia; or (3) Sotheby’s could sell the 
Duryodhana to a museum in a private sale for the purpose of initiating a 
program of cultural exchange with Cambodian museums.47 In reply, the 
Cambodian government expressed its “appreciation of Sotheby’s wish to 
contribute to the cause of preservation and conservation of Khmer cultural 
heritage” and acknowledged that it was exploring Sotheby’s second option, a 
private sale for the purpose of repatriation to Cambodia.48  
As the negotiations between Sotheby’s and the Cambodian government 
progressed, a special agent from the Department of Homeland Security 
emailed an INTERPOL official to express his desire that “prior to the 
Cambodians getting their hands on it, we should be the vehicle utilized for 
that return. Not an Auction house.”49 A little over a month later, the special 
agent wrote to the Director General of the Cambodian General Department 
of Cultural Heritage, requesting that he “[p]lease stop negotiating with 
Sotheby’s if [he] wish[ed] for [the United States] to successfully finish [its] 
investigation.”50 Even more puzzling is the Special Agent’s April 2011 email 
to Sotheby’s declaring, “We now have probable cause that the item was 
 
46 See Sept. 9, 2013 Memorandum of Law, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that the U.S. govern-
ment “ultimately demanded that Cambodia ‘stop negotiating with Sotheby’s’”). 
47 See Sept. 9, 2013 Neiman Declaration, supra note 42, Ex. 4 at 3-4 (offering as an exhibit a 
March 30, 2011 letter from Jane A. Levine to Anne Lemaistre, which outlines three proposed 
courses of action as a compromise between the sale of the sculpture and the preservation of Khmer 
sites and artifacts). 
48 Id. at Ex. 7 at 2 (offering as an exhibit a May 15, 2011 letter from Him Chhem, Minister of 
Culture & Fine Arts, Kingdom of Cambodia, to Jane Levine, Senior Vice President & Worldwide 
Dir. of Compliance, Sotheby’s).  
49 Id. at Ex. 8 at 3 (offering as an exhibit a May 10, 2011 e-mail from Brenton M. Easter, Spe-
cial Agent, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Gloria A. Ford, Program Manager, Cultural Property 
Crimes Program, INTERPOL). 
50 Id. at Ex. 10 at 2 (offering as an exhibit a June 29, 2011 e-mail from Brenton M. Easter, 
Special Agent, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Hab Touch, Dir. Gen., Gen. Dep’t of Cultural 
Heritage, Ministry of Culture & Fine Arts, Kingdom of Cambodia). 
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stolen after Cambodian cultural patrimony laws were enacted.”51 Yet almost 
a month later, the Special Agent emailed a law professor asking “[C]an you 
help us find the actual cultural property laws that protect Cambodian 
antiquities prior to 1975?”52 This correspondence suggests that political 
motivations may have contributed to the government’s decision to pursue 
this action vigorously. 
Another instance where political motives may have played a role relates to 
a pair of Khmer sculptures from the Prasat Chen temple that the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art (the Met) owned until recently. In May 2013, the Met 
voluntarily repatriated this pair of sculptures to Cambodia.53 According to the 
Met’s press release, the Kneeling Attendants had been at the museum since the 
late 1980s to early 1990s and were allegedly looted from the Koh Ker temple 
site as well.54 Although the press release mentioned that the decision to 
repatriate was influenced by newly acquired information, the museum was 
silent on the nature of that information.55 The New York Times, however, 
reported that the additional information included witness statements and 
photographs depicting the bases from which the sculptures had allegedly been 
removed.56 
More recently, in May 2014, the Norton Simon Museum in Pasadena 
decided to return the Bhima to Cambodia.57 The Norton Simon had owned 
the Bhima since 1976, when it “properly acquired” the sculpture from a New 
York dealer.58 An attorney at the Norton Simon maintains that although 
“there are extremely strong legal arguments for why [the Norton Simon] 
could defeat a claim, and . . . Cambodian law is ambiguous at best, . . . it 
seems appropriate and in keeping with the positive relationship the Norton 
 
51 Id. at Ex. 5 at 2 (offering as an exhibit an April 1, 2011 e-mail from Brenton M. Easter, 
Special Agent, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Jane Levine, Senior Vice President & Worldwide Dir. 
of Compliance, Sotheby’s). 
52 Id. at Ex. 6 at 2 (offering as an exhibit an April 19, 2011 e-mail from Brenton M. Easter, 
Special Agent, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Prof. Christian Fischer, UCLA). 
53 See generally Press Release, Metro. Museum of Art, Metropolitan Museum of Art to Return 
Two Khmer Sculptures to Cambodia (May 3, 2013), http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-
museum/press-room/news/2013/Cambodian-returns, archived at http://perma.cc/7VER-6KWU.  
54 Id. For a depiction of one of the statues that the Met returned to Cambodia, see infra  
Figure 4. 
55 Press Release, Metro. Museum of Art, supra note 53. 
56 See Tom Mashberg & Ralph Blumenthal, The Met Plans to Return Art to Cambodia, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2013, at A1 (outlining the evidence offered by Cambodia).  
57 See Press Release, Norton Simon Museum, supra note 10 (noting that the return of the 
statue was a “gesture of friendship, and in response to a unique and compelling request by top 
officials in Cambodia to help rebuild its ‘soul’ as a nation”). 
58 Id. 
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Simon has had with Cambodia over the years to gift the statue to [Cambo-
dia].”59 
There are a variety of reasons why both the Met and the Norton Simon 
may have ultimately decided to repatriate the Khmer sculptures. If the 
Met’s sculptures were actually located in Cambodia until the 1980s, it is 
possible that they were illegally removed from the country in violation of 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Alternatively, the museums may have faced 
political pressure similar to that which Sotheby’s confronted and may have 
desired to avoid the costs associated with extensive litigation and negative 
publicity.60 Finally, the museums may have returned these sculptures to 
maintain favorable relationships with the Cambodian government and art 
institutions.61 In any case, in addition to any legal considerations, the 
museums’ decisions to voluntarily repatriate the sculptures may be indicative 
of the effects of political pressure felt by art institutions facing mounting 
repatriation requests.  
E. Settlement 
After Sotheby’s and Ms. Ruspoli filed their Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings and for a Stay of Discovery in September 2013, Judge Daniels 
entered several orders that delayed further discovery throughout October, 
November, and early December.62 Finally, on December 13, 2013, the parties 
 
59 Mike Boehm, Asian Statue Heads Home; The Norton Simon’s Familiar “Temple Wrestler” Will 
Roost Again in Cambodia, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2014, at D1. 
60 Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the Fiduciary 
Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 425, 451 (2003). 
61 A special exhibition called “Lost Kingdoms: Hindu-Buddhist Sculpture of Early Southeast 
Asia, 5th to 8th Century” opened at the Met in April 2014. Press Release, Metro. Museum of Art, 
Lost Kingdoms: Hindu-Buddhist Sculpture of Early Southeast Asia, 5th to 8th Century: April 14–
July 27, 2014 (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.metmuseum.org/about-the-museum/press-room/ 
exhibitions/2014/lost-kingdoms, archived at http://perma.cc/MPZ3-E59C. The exhibition 
contained sculptures loaned by Cambodia. See Holland Cotter, Gathering of Gods from Places Long 
Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2014, at C23 (“Most of its 160 sculptures, monumental and minute, 
are national treasures in an unprecedented transmigration from Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand 
and Vietnam.”). 
62 See Order, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2013) (adjourning the pretrial conference scheduled for December 10, 2013, to 
February 13, 2014); Order, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 
12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2013) (extending all motion and discovery deadlines by one week at the 
parties’ request); Order, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-
2600 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2013) (extending all motion and discovery deadlines by three weeks at the 
parties’ request); Order, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture, No. 12-
2600 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013) (extending deadlines with respect to claimants’ motion for judgment 
on the pleadings as a result of the federal government shutdown). 
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reached a settlement.63  Despite resolving several significant issues, the 
settlement failed to resolve the uncertainties regarding the government’s 
potential political motivations and the contested points between the parties.64  
The agreement did, however, achieve certain notable accomplishments. 
First, Sotheby’s and Ms. Ruspoli agreed to voluntarily return the sculpture 
to Cambodia within ninety days of the settlement.65 Second, both parties 
agreed that a “good faith disagreement” still exists about whether the 
various decrees ever conferred ownership of the sculpture to Cambodia.66 
Third, the United States conceded that neither Sotheby’s nor Ms. Ruspoli 
“knew or believed that the Statue was owned by the Kingdom of Cambodia.”67 
Finally, the judge dismissed the forfeiture action with prejudice and stipulated 
that the government would not file any additional claims regarding the 
Duryodhana.68  
Publicly, both Sotheby’s and Cambodia appear satisfied with the settlement. 
A Sotheby’s representative maintained that “the agreement confirms that 
Sotheby’s and its client acted properly at all times,” while Cambodia’s 
secretary of state publicized that the country was “very pleased with the 
help from the American government.”69 From a legal perspective, however, 
the settlement is unsatisfying because it precluded Judge Daniels from 
ruling on the disputed interpretations of the French colonial decrees, as well 
as the application of the NSPA to future restitution requests and other 
cultural property disputes.70 The settlement’s failure to resolve these legal 
issues accentuates the need to examine the current legal landscape  
surrounding repatriation requests and to determine steps that could poten-
tially ensure that auction houses do not face similar requests in the future.  
 
63 Stipulation and Order of Settlement, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sand-
stone Sculpture, No. 12-2600 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2013). 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 3 (“Within 90 days of the entry of this Stipulation and Order of Settlement,  
Sotheby’s shall transfer the Statue to a representative of the Kingdom of Cambodia in New York.”). 
66 See id. at 2 (“Sotheby’s and Ms. Ruspoli have a good faith disagreement with the United 
States regarding whether the Kingdom of Cambodia owned the Statue.”).  
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 3. 
69 Mashberg & Blumenthal, supra note 10, at C1.  
70 See infra Section II.F for a further exploration of the NSPA and its application to cultural 
property disputes. 
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II. LAW APPLICABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT’S FORFEITURE ACTION 
In initiating this forfeiture action against the defendant in rem, the United 
States invoked various provisions of the United States Code.71 Because of 
certain legal impediments to filing this action,72 the government assembled a 
somewhat intricate puzzle of code provisions. Forfeiture is unique in that 
“[t]here is no general forfeiture law; rather, the penalty of forfeiture must be 
provided within the particular statute that is violated.”73 Most notably, the 
government based its claim on a provision titled “Proceeds of All Specified 
Unlawful Activity,” which subjects to forfeiture “[a]ny property, real or 
personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to . . . any 
offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity.’”74 Specified unlawful activity, 
through an additional step that invokes a money laundering statute, is then 
defined to include violations of the NSPA.75  
Many advantages follow from the government’s ability to invoke these 
provisions in its forfeiture action against the defendant in rem. First, 
following the implementation of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act76 in 
2000, the government can hold that the “proceeds of a violation of the 
National Stolen Property Act . . . are directly forfeitable under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 981(a)(1)(C).”77 Second, in a civil forfeiture action, the government must 
prove its case by only a preponderance of the evidence—a civil burden of 
proof—even when alleging a violation of the NSPA, a criminal statute.78 
 
71 See Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 28-30 (enumerating the provisions of the 
United States Code upon which the forfeiture complaint was based, i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 545, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315, 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)). 
72 See supra text accompanying notes 79-81. 
73 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 5, at 673. 
74 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (2006) (emphasis added). 
75 For the definition of “specified unlawful activity,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (2006), 
which includes “any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title.” 
Section 1961(1) then outlines that “‘racketeering activity’ means . . . any act which is indictable 
under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: . . . sections 2314 and 2315.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)(2006) (emphasis added). 
76 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 981 (2012)).  
77 GERSTENBLITH, supra note 5, at 675. 
78 See Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced Antiquities and the 
National Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123, 132 n.54 (2010) (“An advantage to bringing a 
civil forfeiture in rem action is the lower burden of proof: the United States must prove that a 
crime has occurred under the lower civil standard (preponderance of the evidence) rather than the 
more stringent criminal standard (beyond a reasonable doubt).”). 
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Finally, the NSPA is the only statute applicable to this civil forfeiture action 
that applies retroactively.79  
The government must resort to alleging a violation of the NSPA  
because the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983 
(CCPIA)80—the United States’ implementation of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention—and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 
Cambodia and the United States do not apply. These agreements and the 
CCPIA were all passed or ratified after the period during which the 
Duryodhana is alleged to have left Cambodia, between the late 1960s and 
1972, and they do not apply retroactively.81 Although these sources do not 
apply to the Duryodhana, an overview of their scope and implications 
provides a background for how they could apply to similar cultural property 
disputes or restitution requests in the future. 
A. The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
 The 1970 UNESCO Convention bolsters countries’ existing import and 
export restrictions in an effort to limit the illicit trade in cultural property.82 
It defines cultural property broadly to include any property “which, on 
religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being 
of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or sci-
 
79 18 U.S.C. § 545, which criminalizes smuggling, is also favorable to the government. “Proof 
of defendant’s possession of such goods” creates a rebuttable presumption of guilty knowledge. 18 
U.S.C. § 545 (2006); see also 14 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYERS EDITION § 37:1134 (2011) 
(“Proof of the defendant’s possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, 
is deemed evidence sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of smuggling goods into the 
United States.”).  
80 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2350 
(1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2012)).  
81 See id.; Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions 
on Khmer Archaeological Material, U.S.–Cambodia, art. 1(C), Sept. 19, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 03-919 
(“Such import restrictions shall become effective on the date the Designated List is published in 
the U.S. Federal Register . . . . Emergency import restrictions covering Khmer stone sculpture, 
first promulgated by regulation on December 2, 1999, shall remain in effect.”); Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property, art. 21, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion] (“This Convention shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of the 
third instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession . . . .”); Import Restrictions Imposed on 
Certain Khmer Stone Archaeological Material of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,479, 
67,479 (Dec. 2, 1999) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 12.104g (2013)) (imposing emergency import 
restrictions on certain Khmer artifacts pursuant to the 1970 UNESCO Convention). 
82 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 81, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234 (implementing  
“proposals on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of 
ownership of cultural property”).  
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ence.”83 Article 7(b) of the Convention forbids State Parties from importing 
stolen cultural property (specifically, cultural property stolen “from a 
museum or a religious or secular public monument”) and addresses the 
procedures that State Parties should undertake when returning stolen 
property at the request of another State Party.84 Article 9 allows a State 
Party to seek assistance from other State Parties when it believes its cultural 
property is in danger of looting.85 While the UNESCO Convention has 
facilitated numerous repatriations since its enactment, certain scholars have 
criticized the Convention for various reasons. In particular, critics have 
noted that few countries have enacted implementing legislation for the 
Convention,86 that the Convention unfairly burdens source nations com-
pared to market nations,87 and that the Convention’s provisions apply only to 
cultural property exported from its country of origin after November 1970.88  
B. The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act  
The CCPIA implemented the 1970 UNESCO Convention in the United 
States.89 Congress, which did not enact the CCPIA until 1983, chose to 
 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 240 (advising State Parties to “take appropriate steps to recover and return any 
such cultural property imported after the entry into force of this Convention in both States 
concerned, provided, however, that the resulting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent 
purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that property”). 
85 See id. at 242 (resolving that the State Parties “undertake . . . to participate in a concerted 
international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the 
control of exports and imports and international commerce in the specific materials concerned”).  
86 See Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends Toward a Liberal  
Exchange of Cultural Objects, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1067, 1077 (2005) (noting that “[t]he 
United States is one of the few countries with implementing legislation”). 
87 See Predita C. Rostomian, Looted Art in the U.S. Market, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 271, 281 
(2002) (noting that the UNESCO Convention “places the brunt of th[e] burden” of preventing 
the export of illicit cultural property on source nations, while market nations that have more 
resources (such as the United States) must “merely prohibit the import of such property by 
checking for valid certificates”).  
88 See Katherine D. Vitale, The War on Antiquities: United States Law and Foreign Cultural Prop-
erty, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835, 1842 (2009) (“[C]ritics point to the fact that the 1970 
UNESCO Convention has no retroactive protections, and therefore, does not apply to cultural 
property stolen or illegally exported before November 1970.”). 
89 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2350 
(1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2012)); see also Patty Gerstenblith & 
Katharyn Hanson, Congressional Responses to the Looting of Iraq’s Cultural Property (“One of the first 
market nations to ratify this convention, the United States enacted implementing legisla-
tion . . . in 1983.”), in ANTIQUITIES UNDER SIEGE: CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION 
AFTER THE IRAQ WAR 103, 104 (Lawrence Rothfield ed., 2008). 
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implement only Articles 7(b) and 9 of the UNESCO Convention.90 Because 
the CCPIA implements a treaty to which the United States is a party, the 
act “should be considered the United States’ authoritative statement on its 
policy toward foreign cultural property.”91 It took over ten years for the 
United States to implement the UNESCO Convention, in part because of 
disagreement in Congress.92  Prior to the CCPIA, certain members of 
Congress worried that implementing legislation would disadvantage the 
United States if there were a lack of international cooperation in the 
restitution of cultural property.93  
Between 1973 and 1983, Congress strove to craft legislation that accom-
modated different factions, such as auction houses, museums, and academics.94 
One of the most significant provisions of the CCPIA is codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 2602. This provision allows the President to enter into bilateral 
agreements with other State Parties to apply specific import restrictions 
when four conditions are met: (1) the cultural property of the State Party “is 
in jeopardy,” (2) the State Party has affirmatively attempted “to protect its 
cultural patrimony,” (3) import restrictions would be “of substantial benefit” 
and the least drastic available option, and (4) the implementation of import 
restrictions would align with the “general interest of the international 
community in the interchange of cultural property.”95 Additionally, section 
2605 established the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC),96 a 
State Department body that reviews requests for U.S. import restrictions 
on cultural property using section 2602’s four factors.97 A final point to note 
 
90 See Bonnie Magness-Gardiner, International Conventions and Cultural Heritage Protection 
(“The United States, however, does not implement every article in the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion. Under the CCPIA, it implements articles 9 and 7(b).”), in MARKETING HERITAGE: 
ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE CONSUMPTION OF THE PAST 27, 33 (Yorke Rowan & Uzi Baram 
eds., 2004); see also supra Section II.A. 
91 Vitale, supra note 88, at 1843. 
92 See James F. Fitzpatrick, A Wayward Course: The Lawless Customs Policy Toward Cultural 
Properties, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 857, 859 (1983) (detailing the “painstaking efforts of 
Congress to balance the legitimate but sharply competing goals of archaeologists and anthropologists, 
art dealers and collectors, museum directors, the academic community, and . . . bureaucrats”). 
93 See S. REP. NO. 97-564, at 27 (1982) (“In previous years’ consideration of various proposals for 
implementing legislation, a particularly nettlesome issue was how to formulate standards establishing 
that U.S. controls would not be administered unilaterally.”). 
94 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 858-60 (discussing the passage of the CCPIA after a decade 
of attempts).  
95 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2012). 
96 Id. § 2605. 
97 See James Cuno, U.S. Art Museums and Cultural Property, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 189, 190 
(2001) (describing the structure of the CPAC and its recommendation process). 
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is that the CCPIA defines “stolen” colloquially, applying the term to objects 
to which an owner had previously claimed possession.98  
C. The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects 
The UNIDROIT Convention was adopted in 1995 to supplement the 
1970 UNESCO Convention and reach a more uniform international 
agreement. 99  Unlike the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the UNIDROIT 
Convention allows private individuals to initiate restitution requests.100 
However, the UNIDROIT Convention limits the time period during which 
a repatriation claim may be brought. An individual must initiate her claim 
within three years of learning of the object’s new location and within fifty 
years of the original theft of the object.101 As the United States has not 
signed the UNIDROIT Convention,102 a more detailed analysis of the 
Convention is not necessary. The United States has likely chosen not to 
become a party to UNIDROIT, in part because of the criticisms voiced by 
many actors in the art world. Americans are uncertain about the UNIDROIT 
Convention because it does not define many of the terms it employs.103 And, 
in Europe, the European Fine Arts Fund considered discontinuing the art 
fairs in Maastricht or Basel if the Netherlands or Switzerland signed 
UNIDROIT.104 
 
98 See 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2012) (defining “stolen” to encompass an “article of cultural property 
documented as appertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious or secular public monu-
ment”); Urice, supra note 78, at 127 (“The CCPIA, thus, adopts a conventional definition of 
‘stolen,’ limiting its meaning to a known object over which an owner exercised dominion and 
control.”).  
99 See Derek Fincham, How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow of Illicit Cultural 
Property, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 111, 133-35 (2008) (describing the features of the UNIDROIT 
Convention).  
100 See id. at 134-35 (comparing the UNIDROIT Convention with the 1970 UNESCO  
Convention).  
101 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, art. 3, June 24, 
1995, 2421 U.N.T.S. 457. 
102 See Status, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last updated Sept. 16, 2014, 
2:52 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/9KTD-HRBV (listing the nations that are signatories to the 
UNIDROIT Convention).  
103 See 2 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLEC-
TORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 717 (3d ed. 2005) (opining that “the lack of 
definitions would cause problems in an American judicial system that generally defines all terms”). 
104 See Derek Fincham, Getting the UNIDROIT Convention All Wrong, ILLICIT CULTURAL 
PROPERTY (Dec. 17, 2010, 5:52 PM), http://illicit-cultural-property.blogspot.com/2010/12/getting-
unidroit-convention-all-wrong.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G89P-XSRH (analyzing the 
potential impact of the UNIDROIT Convention and discussing the various responses to the 
treaty from actors in the art world).  
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D. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between  
Cambodia and the United States 
Pursuant to the CCPIA, the President—with the advice of the CPAC—
institutes bilateral agreements, or Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), 
when a State Party requests the United States’ assistance in protecting its 
cultural property. 105  A bilateral agreement between Cambodia and the 
United States has existed since 1999, when President Bill Clinton enacted 
emergency import restrictions on certain Cambodian materials.106 Under 
the CCPIA, a MOU can continue for up to five years from the date on 
which it enters into force,107 at which point the agreement either expires or 
can be renewed for another period not to exceed five years.108 In September 
2013, Cambodia and the United States extended their MOU for yet another 
five years.109 The MOU between these two countries applies to certain 
“archaeological material from Cambodia from the Bronze Age through the 
Khmer Era.”110 If the MOU had been in force before the Duryodhana departed 
Cambodia, it would have applied to the sculpture, as it restricts the importation 
of “statuary in stone,” including sandstone from the “Angkorian (9th-14th c.)” 
period.111 
E. The National Stolen Property Act 
The NSPA, which is the federal law that the United States invoked in 
its civil forfeiture action,112 should arguably not apply to the Duryodhana’s 
situation. This law mandates that an individual who transports an object 
worth at least $5000 across state or foreign boundaries, or who receives or 
 
105 See 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (authorizing the President to enter bilateral 
agreements with State Parties who request protection of their cultural patrimony); see also 
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 257 
(2002) (describing the President’s authority to enter into bilateral agreements pursuant to the 
CCPIA). 
106 Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Khmer Stone Archaeological Material of the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,479, 67,479 (Dec. 2, 1999) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 12.104g 
(2013)). 
107 19 U.S.C. § 2602(b) (2012). 
108 Id. § 2602(e). 
109 Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material From Cambodia 
From the Bronze Age Through the Khmer Era, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,832, 56,832-33 (Sept. 16, 2013) 
(codified at 19 C.F.R. § 12.104g (2013)). 
110 Id.  
111 See Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material from Cambodia, 
73 Fed. Reg. 54,309, 54,310-11 (Sept. 19, 2008) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 12.104g (2013)) (detailing 
the scope of the import restrictions imposed by the U.S.–Cambodian MOU). 
112 See supra text accompanying notes 75-80. 
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possesses such an object, with knowledge that the object is stolen, will be 
subject to fines or imprisonment.113 The NSPA was originally enacted as an 
expansion upon the 1919 National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, also known as 
the Dyer Act.114 Congress enacted the Dyer Act as a response to an unexpected 
increase in theft stemming from the invention of the automobile.115 Today, 
certain practitioners and scholars view as equally unexpected both the evolution 
of the Dyer Act into the NSPA and its application in the cultural property 
context in the CCPIA’s stead.116 
Some actors in the art world believe that the NSPA should not apply to 
cultural property issues, because the CCPIA represents the United States’ 
position regarding illicit movement of cultural property and restitution.117 
The application of the NSPA in the cultural property context has been 
heavily reproached for diverging from the CCPIA in its treatment of 
cultural property issues.118 Whereas the NSPA applies retroactively, the 
CCPIA is prospective, and whereas case law broadly interprets the defini-
tion of “stolen” in the NSPA, the CCPIA’s definition is much narrower.119 
The imposition of criminal penalties on members of the art community, 
based on their possession of works of art that might have been acquired 
 
113 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012). Note that “post-acquisition knowledge” that property is 
stolen fulfills the NSPA’s knowledge requirement. Urice, supra note 78, at 158. 
114 See Urice, supra note 78, at 133 (discussing the passage of the Dyer Act and the origins of 
the NSPA). 
115 See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413-14 (1957) (“The automobile was uniquely 
suited to felonious taking . . . . It was a valuable, salable article which itself supplied the means 
for speedy escape. . . . This challenge could be best met through the use of the Federal 
Government’s jurisdiction over interstate commerce.”).  
116 See, e.g., William G. Pearlstein, White Paper: A Proposal to Reform U.S. Law and Policy Relating 
to the International Exchange of Cultural Property, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 561, 610 (2014) 
(“[W]hile it is true that there have been a limited number of criminal prosecutions under the 
NSPA, there have been an increasing number of civil forfeitures based on increasingly tenuous 
factual and legal grounds, which amount to administrative abuse of the stolen property laws.”); 
Stephen K. Urice, Elizabeth Taylor’s Van Gogh: An Alternative Route to Restitution of Holocaust Art?, 
22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38 (2011) (“Although works of art are 
typically treated as ‘goods’ for purposes of U.S. law, art’s unique characteristics fit uncomfortably 
into a general theft statute.”). 
117 See, e.g., Adam Goldberg, Reaffirming McClain: The National Stolen Property Act and the 
Abiding Trade in Looted Cultural Objects, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1031, 1046 (2006) (describing the legal 
critique that the CCPIA, “which implements U.S. obligations under the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention . . . , should preempt [the application of the NSPA]”). 
118 The NSPA has been interpreted to require “that a state have both a valid patrimony law 
and a restriction on exportation of the kind of property contemplated by the patrimony law.” 
Vitale, supra note 88, at 1851 (citing United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 & n.14 (5th Cir. 
1977)). Here, as discussed in Section I.C, it is unclear whether Cambodia had a valid patrimony 
law at the time the Duryodhana left the country. This was one of the most heavily disputed points 
between the parties. 
119 See id. at 1859-61 (noting the differences between the NSPA and the CCPIA). 
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many years ago,120 is also disturbing. During debate prior to passage of the 
CCPIA, members of Congress twice attempted to limit the NSPA’s 
scope.121 Although the federal courts of appeals have addressed the applica-
tion of the NSPA in the cultural property context in only three cases,122 
their rulings have created much controversy—especially the Fifth Circuit’s 
decisions in United States v. McClain.123 As part of their efforts to limit the 
scope of the NSPA, those same members of Congress unsuccessfully 
attempted to overturn the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the law. 124 
Senator Dole expressed his concern that the NSPA, as interpreted in 
McClain, “may render criminal liability under U.S. law essentially contin-
gent on the export laws of other countries. Many question whether the 
court’s interpretation of McClain thus is overly broad as a matter of national 
policy.”125  
F. The Interpretation of the NSPA in Federal Appellate Decisions 
United States v. Hollinshead126 was the first federal appellate decision to 
interpret the NSPA as applied to the transportation of cultural property.127 
In Hollinshead, the defendant was a pre-Columbian artifact dealer who 
worked with a coconspirator in Belize to ship pre-Columbian steles from 
Guatemala to the defendant’s home in California, labeling the boxes as 
containing “personal effects.”128 The Ninth Circuit held that in order to be 
found liable under the NSPA, the defendant did not need to be aware of the 
Guatemalan ownership law; rather, he needed to be aware only that the 
steles were stolen.129 The court interpreted “stolen” as used in the NSPA to 
 
120  See Urice, supra note 78, at 157-58 (“It is reasonable to assume that many, if not 
most, . . . antiquities [in museums] lack documentation of legal export from their country of 
modern discovery. . . . [C]ontinued possession of such works would constitute a crime under the 
NSPA . . . .”). 
121 See Cuno, supra note 97, at 193 (detailing certain senators’ unsuccessful efforts to amend 
the McClain doctrine). 
122 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McClain (McClain 
II), 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. McClain (McClain I), 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). 
123 McClain II, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979); McClain I, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).  
124 See Cuno, supra note 97, at 193 (“Both times the [reform] bill was opposed by officials of 
the State Department and U.S. Customs and was defeated.”). 
125 128 CONG. REC. 25,347 (1982) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole). 
126 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).  
127 Derek Fincham, Why U.S. Federal Penalties for Dealing in Illicit Cultural Property Are Ineffec-
tive, and a Pragmatic Alternative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 612 (“The first attempt to 
apply the NSPA to nationalized antiquities came in 1974 in United States v. Hollinshead.”). 
128 495 F.2d at 1155. 
129 Id. at 1156. 
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mean “acquired, or possessed, as a result of some wrongful or dishonest act 
or taking, whereby a person willfully obtains or retains possession of 
property which belongs to another . . . with the intent to deprive the 
owner of the benefit of ownership.”130 This definition is much broader than 
the one employed in the CCPIA, which is limited to known objects that 
have been inventoried as belonging to museums or monuments.131 
In United States v. McClain, the Fifth Circuit built upon the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of the NSPA. In McClain, a group of defendant dealers 
were charged with violating the NSPA after contacting an employee at the 
Mexican Cultural Institute in San Antonio and offering to sell pre-Columbian 
antiquities from Mexico, knowing that they had illegally exported the antiqui-
ties from Mexico.132 Although the court held that a 1972 Mexican law—the 
Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic, and Historic Monuments and Zones, 
May 6, 1972—conferred ownership of the antiquities to Mexico,133 it was not 
convinced of the exact exportation date of the goods that the defendants had 
offered to sell.134 Because of this uncertainty, the court reversed the defendants’ 
convictions and remanded the case to the district court.135  
Two years later, McClain came before the Fifth Circuit again.136 Upon 
remand, the district court had convicted the defendants of violating the 
NSPA and conspiracy to violate the NSPA.137 The Fifth Circuit, however, 
held that although the defendants were liable for conspiracy to sell stolen 
goods in foreign commerce under the NSPA, their conviction for the 
“substantive” violation had to be reversed.138 The court reversed the defendants’ 
conviction on this “substantive” count because of its concern that at trial, the 
jury was incorrectly informed that Mexico had an ownership law in place 
since at least as early as 1897, which may have influenced the jury’s view of 
whether the goods were stolen.139 Thus, the court opined, “the defendants 
may have suffered the prejudice of being convicted pursuant to laws that were 
 
130 Id. 
131 See supra note 98 for the definition of “stolen” under the CCPIA. 
132 McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1977). 
133 Id. at 1000. 
134 See id. at 1003 (“Under a proper view of the law, it is extremely important to the issue of 
guilt or innocence for the jury to know or to make a fair inference as to just when the artifacts were 
exported.” (emphasis added)). 
135 Id. at 1004. 
136 McClain II, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979). 
137 Id. at 659. 
138 Id. at 672. 
139 Id. at 670. 
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too vague to be a predicate for criminal liability under our jurisprudential 
standards.”140 
Although both incarnations of McClain deal with various procedural 
concerns, they stand for the proposition that a clear and unambiguous 
“declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of 
an article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered 
‘stolen’, within the meaning of” the NSPA.141 Or, as Dr. Stephen Urice 
proposes, the “McClain Doctrine” may be interpreted as: 
(Enactment of Foreign Nation Vesting Statute) + (Illegal Export) = Stolen.142 
Most recently, the Second Circuit interpreted the NSPA in 2003 in 
United States v. Schultz.143 The defendant, Mr. Schultz, became involved in 
an elaborate scheme to sell Egyptian antiquities in which he acted as an 
agent for an acquaintance who smuggled various sculptures out of Egypt.144 
Once the sculptures arrived in the United States, Mr. Schultz used the fake 
provenance of the “Thomas Alcock Collection” to attract buyers, claiming 
that the sculptures had belonged to this collection since the 1920s.145 The 
exportation of these goods violated a 1983 Egyptian patrimony law.146 
The Second Circuit adopted McClain I’s distinction “between mere  
unlawful export and actual theft,” 147 reiterating the proposition that “a 
declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of 
an article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered 
‘stolen,’ within the meaning of the [NSPA].”148 The Second Circuit went 
one step further than the McClain I court, however, to hold that the foreign 
country’s “government [must also] assert[] actual ownership of the property 
pursuant to a valid patrimony law” in order for an object to be considered 
stolen.149 Thus, under Dr. Urice’s formula, the “Schultz Doctrine” holds that: 
(Enactment of Foreign Nation Vesting Statute) + (Foreign Nation’s Assertion of 
Actual Ownership) + (Illegal Export) = Stolen.150 
 
140 Id. 
141 McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1977). 
142 Urice, supra note 78, at 130. 
143 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003). 
144 Id. at 396. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 398. 
147 Id. at 403.  
148 Id. (quoting McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
149 Id. at 416.  
150 Urice, supra note 78, at 131. 
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Because Second Circuit precedent is controlling in the Southern District 
of New York, the United States would have had to satisfy the Schultz 
standard in order to successfully invoke the NSPA had United States v. A 
10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture progressed. Under Schultz, the 
United States would have had to demonstrate not only that the French 
colonial decrees confer ownership to Cambodia, but also that Cambodia has 
enforced the decrees and claimed actual ownership. As mentioned in 
Section I.C, this remains a disputed point between the parties.  
G. Critique of the Current Legal Structure  
This overview of the current legal structure, including the inapplicability 
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the CCPIA, and the MOU to the 
Duryodhana, as well as the application of the NSPA criminal statute to a 
civil forfeiture proceeding, demonstrates why certain scholars view this 
framework to be deficient. Although international agreements have  
attempted to remedy deficiencies of inconsistent and unclear laws across 
countries, critiques still abound. Critics claim that the legal response is 
outdated, inconsistent, and difficult to follow,151 especially when countries 
have differing cultural patrimony laws.152 Again, part of this lack of clarity 
in the legal structure may be politically motivated; there is a political 
motivation for countries to fail to clearly distinguish between ownership 
laws and export laws. Consumers of these antiquities come from within the 
country, not just from foreign countries. Thus, governments may create 
“escape clauses” for ownership in their laws to avoid recovery from wealthy 
and influential citizens in their own countries.153 
 
151 See, e.g., Andrew L. Adler & Stephen K. Urice, Resolving the Disjunction Between Cultural 
Property Policy and Law: A Call for Reform, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 117, 123 (2011) (arguing that 
“[t]he legal framework is the product of an era that has long since passed, and [that] it should be 
modernized to reflect the more sophisticated dialogue taking place today”).  
152 See, e.g., Christa L. Kirby, Stolen Cultural Property: Available Museum Responses to an Interna-
tional Dilemma, 104 DICK. L. REV. 729, 733-34 (2000) (explaining that “the governing law and 
museum guidelines do not treat all forms of stolen cultural property in the same manner. . . . This 
lack of uniformity in the law and in museum response creates uncertainty for museums, true owners, 
and countries of origin”).  
153 Hall, supra note 27.  
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III. PROPOSAL: AUCTION HOUSES SHOULD LOOK TO MUSEUMS FOR 
GUIDANCE IN NAVIGATING THIS INCONSISTENT  
AND OUTDATED LEGAL RESPONSE 
The question remains how auction houses should address repatriation 
requests when the current legal response is unclear and inconsistent. Rather 
than attempt to remedy the uncertainty by drafting a new statute or inter-
national agreement, a potential solution that would be both complicated and 
time-consuming, I propose instead that auction houses adopt an ethics-
based response. Specifically, auction houses should look to art museums and 
the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums as guides for creating their own 
uniform code of ethics.  
A. Legal Distinctions Between Museums and Auction Houses 
In order to address how the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums can 
guide auction houses in formulating their own code of ethics, it is important 
to acknowledge the legal distinctions between museums and auction houses, 
as those legal distinctions will inform the behavior suggested in the code 
provisions. Unlike museums, auction houses usually do not acquire title to 
the works that they put up for auction; rather, they function as intermediaries 
between sellers and buyers.154 Thus, due to time and resource constraints, it is 
impracticable for auction houses to conduct detailed due diligence on every 
object available at auction.155 By contrast, because museums do have title to 
the works they acquire, they conduct a greater degree of due diligence,156 
which has only increased in recent years.157 Auction houses can conduct 
extensive due diligence in researching provenance only when an object, 
 
154 See Kimberly L. Alderman, The Ethical Trade in Cultural Property: Ethics and Law in the 
Antiquity Auction Industry, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 549, 553 (2008) (“Auction houses, like 
realtors, are sales agents for their clients. . . . When an auction house auctions an item, it is not 
offering the object for sale but, instead, whatever state of title that the current owner holds.”).  
155 See 2 FRANKLIN FELDMAN ET AL., ART LAW: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF CREATORS 
AND COLLECTORS § 10.1.6, at 193 (1986) (“Auctioneers say that, unlike conventional art dealers, 
they handle a volume that is far too great to permit exhaustive examination and investigation of 
every lot they offer.”). 
156 See Cuno, supra note 97, at 190-91 (describing circumstances museums consider when ac-
quiring works); Lauren McBrayer, The Art of Deaccession: An Ethical Perspective (noting that “by 
law a museum is free to make an acquisition of a work of art without complete evidence of its legal 
standing as long as the museum has researched the work of art thoroughly and notified the 
appropriate governmental authorities of the likely country of origin”), in ALI-ABA COURSE OF 
STUDY: LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 341, 352 (2005).  
157 See Victoria Reed, Due Diligence, Provenance Research, and the Acquisition Process at the Museum 
of Fine Arts, Boston, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 363, 366 (2013) (noting the 
increasing extent to which museums exercise diligence). 
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based on its country of origin and other factors, presents an increased risk 
of illicit transportation.158 
B. A Proposed Uniform Code of Ethics for Auction Houses  
These legal distinctions demonstrate that requiring auction houses to 
undertake the same level of due diligence as museums could be extremely 
burdensome due to auction houses’ time and resource constraints. Scholars 
have proposed various improvements to the legal framework through which 
auction houses address cultural property restitution claims, such as turning 
to alternative dispute resolution (mediation in particular)159 or undertaking 
statutory or international agreement reform.160 I propose that instead of 
pursuing these options, auction houses should adopt a uniform code of 
ethics. A uniform code of ethics would have many of the same advantages 
cited by proponents of mediation, such as the ability to sidestep problematic 
legal impediments encountered in arbitration and litigation161 and to avoid 
the constraints of adhering to a specific law.162  
 
158 See Alderman, supra note 154, at 559 (explaining that, in certain cases, “the house requires 
the seller to provide paperwork of provenance to show the seller legally obtained the object”). 
159 Several scholars have addressed the advantages of employing alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) to resolve cultural property disputes. See, e.g., Anne Laure Bandle & Sarah Theurich, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Art-Law: A New Research Project of the Geneva Art-Law Centre, 6 
J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 28, 34-38 (2011) (offering examples of disputes resolved through 
arbitration and other ADR methods); Evangelos I. Gegas, International Arbitration and the 
Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes: Navigating the Stormy Waters Surrounding Cultural Property, 13 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 129, 163-65 (1997) (proposing an international arbitration tribunal 
for the resolution of cultural property disputes); Sam Markowitz, Note, A Meteorite and A Lost City: 
Mutually Beneficial Solutions Through Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
219, 244-49 (2012) (suggesting that the use of formal judicial proceedings to resolve cultural property 
disputes is less effective than is ADR). 
160 See Adler & Urice, supra note 151, at 123-25, 159-63 (proposing statutory reform to deal 
with an antiquated legal framework and to mitigate separation of powers concerns); Derek 
Fincham, supra note 127, at 644-45 (offering a “pragmatic” alternative to U.S. federal criminal 
regulation of cultural property that would allow buyers and sellers to check that their purchases are 
legitimate); Edward M. Cottrell, Comment, Keeping the Barbarians Outside the Gate: Toward a 
Comprehensive International Agreement Protecting Cultural Property, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 627, 648-56 
(2009) (proposing the formation of an unbiased international body to resolve cultural property 
disputes). 
161 See Nate Mealy, Mediation’s Potential Role in International Cultural Property Disputes, 26 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 169, 203 (2011) (noting that “if a source nation wishes to bring suit 
to recover a piece of its cultural property in the U.S., it must be prepared to contend with fifty 
different sets of state substantive and procedural laws, an overlaying federal law system, [and] local 
court rules”). 
162 See id. at 197 (explaining that mediation can be beneficial because it does not require  
application of any particular substantive law). 
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Furthermore, a uniform code of ethics would function prophylactically, 
preventing the parties from reaching the point at which they would need to 
resort to alternative dispute resolution or litigation. Finally, a code of ethics 
would be especially advantageous in dealing with repatriation requests from 
countries, such as Cambodia, that have only recently overcome periods of 
political turmoil163 and that may lack a clear and consistent legal stance toward 
preserving cultural property.164  For such countries, a code of ethics would 
outline a more certain and predictable response to repatriation requests. 
In fashioning this code of ethics, auction houses should consult the codes 
of ethics created by the American Alliance of Museums (AAM),165 the 
Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD),166 and the ICOM.167 The 
ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, which was adopted in 1986,168 is 
viewed as the gold standard for shaping ethical guidelines within the 
international museum community.169 For this reason, auction houses should 
focus on the provisions within the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums that 
address provenance and restitution issues.170 Dr. Patty Gerstenblith has 
criticized the AAMD and the AAM for failing to fulfill the standards 
 
163 See CORFIELD, supra note 20, at 121-34 (detailing recent political upheavals in Cambodia). 
164 See Charney, supra note 21 (recounting an interview with Cambodia’s Prince Ravivaddhana 
Sisowath, who admitted that although Cambodians now “take pride in their antiquities,” the 
“preservation of ancient things is not a part of [their] traditional culture”).  
165 Code of Ethics for Museums, AM. ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS, http://www.aam-us.org/ 
resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L6G2-V4Z6.  
166 Code of Ethics, ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., https://aamd.org/about/code-of-ethics 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PD2U-55DK.  
167 INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, supra note 7.  
168 Id.  
169 See Elaine L. Johnston, Evolving Standards for Collections: Antiquities and Archeological Material 
(explaining that “[t]he ICOM Code of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1986, sets forth the most 
detailed and specific standards of all the relevant codes of ethics”), in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 699, 709 (2000). 
170 Section 2.3 of the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, entitled “Provenance and Due 
Diligence,” instructs that “[e]very effort must be made before acquisition to ensure that any object 
or specimen offered for purchase, gift, loan, bequest, or exchange has not been illegally obtained 
in, or exported from its country of origin . . . . Due diligence in this regard should establish the 
full history of the item since discovery or production.” INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, supra 
note 7. Section 6.3, entitled “Restitution of Cultural Property,” further outlines that  
[w]hen a country or people of origin seeks the restitution of an object or specimen 
that can be demonstrated to have been exported or otherwise transferred in violation 
of the principles of international and national conventions, and shown to be part of 
that country’s or people’s cultural or natural heritage, the museum concerned should, 
if legally free to do so, take prompt and responsible steps to cooperate in its return. 
Id. 
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outlined by the ICOM.171 She contends that the AAM’s and AAMD’s codes 
are imprecise and foster perverse incentives, such as encouraging museum 
directors to remain ignorant of legal requirements.172 
Sotheby’s has already taken a first step towards developing a code of 
ethics.173 Its website contains a page created in 2007 entitled “Sotheby’s 
Code of Business Conduct and Ethics.”174 However, the code does not 
mention any ethical considerations or procedures that employees should 
follow when considering whether to sell an item at auction.175 Rather, the 
code focuses on issues of legal compliance, fair dealing, conflicts of interest, 
confidentiality, insider trading, and public disclosures.176  
The ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, however, can provide insight 
to Sotheby’s and other auction houses regarding the creation of such ethical 
procedures. When tailoring the provisions included in the ICOM Code of 
Ethics for Museums for use in their own ethical codes, auction houses 
should attempt to avoid the aspects of the AAMD’s Code of Ethics and the 
NSPA that have been criticized—namely, that these provisions encourage 
actors to be willfully ignorant of the law so that no liability accrues. At the 
same time, the code should consider that it may not be feasible for auction 
houses to undertake the same degree of due diligence as museums in 
 
171 See Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 197, 243 (2001). 
172 See id. (“The AAMD Code . . . ignores the issue of illegal excavation and illegal export 
from the country of origin . . . . It . . . forbid[s] only those actions which the director knows 
are illegal. The AAM Code of Ethics is even vaguer. . . . It establishes no specific standards of 
conduct and requires no due diligence or effective search on the part of the museum in acquiring 
objects.”). Note, too, that some museums have gone beyond the standards outlined in the ICOM 
Code of Ethics for Museums. For example, the Indianapolis Museum of Art will not acquire a piece 
unless it left its country of origin after 1970 or the museum has obtained evidence of a legal export. 
See Derek Fincham, Towards a Rigorous Standard for the Good Faith Acquisition of Antiquities, 37 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 145, 184 (2010) (discussing the Indianapolis Museum of Art’s policy). 
173 Research on the websites of other large auction houses, such as Christie’s, Bonhams, and 
Phillips, did not indicate that other auction houses have adopted similar codes of conduct. However, 
Sotheby’s increased disclosure to the public is perhaps attributable to the fact that it is a publicly 
traded company, while the other auction houses are privately held. For more information on the 
public-versus-private nature of auction houses, see Graham Bowley, The (Auction) House Doesn’t 
Always Win, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, at C1 (noting that “Christie’s is owned by François Pinault, the 
French luxury-goods magnate, while Phillips’s owner is the Russian company Mercury Group”).  
174 Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, SOTHEBY’S (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.sothebys.com 
/en/inside/corporate-governance/bus-ethics-conduct.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/BTA2-S4G2. 
175 Under the heading “Basic Principles,” Sotheby’s code mandates that employees “report any 
illegal or unethical behavior or any other behavior that violates this Code or company policies.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Beyond this provision, the code fails to mention any ethical principles. Id. 
176 Id.; see Alderman, supra note 154, at 569-70 (contending that auction houses treat ethical 
considerations as byproducts of legal compliance). 
  
276 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 249 
 
determining which lots will be put up for auction. Thus, proposed provi-
sions for ethical principles modeled after the ICOM Code of Ethics could 
read:  
Provenance: In determining which lots to put up for auction, all employees 
shall be confident that the objects have not been illegally exported from their 
countries of origin. Taking into account the age of the object and its country 
of origin, as well as the auction house’s time and resource constraints, the 
employees shall be satisfied with the sufficiency and veracity of the object’s 
provenance before including the object in an auction. Employees shall use 
their own judgment regarding whether to include an object that left its country 
of origin after 1970. 
Restitution of Cultural Property: Auction house employees shall comply with 
restitution requests issued by an auction item’s country of origin, as long as 
certain conditions are met, and shall encourage the owner of the object to 
comply as well. These conditions include verification that the object belongs 
to the country of origin’s cultural heritage, and verification that the object 
was exported against international agreements such as the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention or Memoranda of Understanding between countries.177  
While both of these model provisions would be significant if auction houses 
were to adopt them as part of a uniform code of ethics, special attention 
should be given to the provision regarding provenance. If auction houses 
were to adopt and focus, as much as is practicable, on the ethical guidelines 
outlined in the model provenance provision, they would likely face fewer 
repatriation requests in the future. The provisions proposed here are merely 
basic suggestions designed to demonstrate an alternative to the current 
options available to address cultural property disputes—namely, litigation 
and alternative dispute resolution. Using these principles as a model, 
auction houses should carefully consider how best to alter the model 
provisions to formulate uniform and workable ethical guidelines.  
CONCLUSION 
United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone Sculpture illustrates 
the need for a more consistent and predictable legal framework from which 
to address repatriation claims. The current legal framework allows for a 
case-by-case analysis dependent on laws that vary by country. Although the 
 
177 These provisions are modeled after provisions in the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums. 
See INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, supra note 7.  
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tangled web of international agreements, patrimony laws, and statutes is in 
certain instances helpful with repatriation claims, it is nevertheless ineffective 
in other instances where the laws are ambiguous or inapplicable. For the 
Duryodhana, where international conventions and cultural property statutes 
do not apply because of their dates of enactment or ratification, the govern-
ment resorted to an attenuated invocation of the NSPA in its civil forfeiture 
action, which arguably does not comport with the congressional intent 
behind the United States’ implementing legislation for the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention. Rather than attempt to revise the current legal framework, 
auction houses should fashion a uniform code of ethics modeled after the 
ICOM’s Code of Ethics for Museums. An ethics-based response, while 
encompassing many of the advantages touted by proponents of alternative 
dispute resolution, is unique in that it can function prophylactically to 
prevent auction houses from being confronted with repatriation requests in 
the first place. Because repatriation requests from countries such as Cambodia 
have increased in recent years, prompt reform is necessary to ensure that sales 
at auction houses are not stunted by fear of legal repercussions. Unless such 
a response is devised, proponents of neither cultural nationalism nor 
cultural internationalism will be able to fully appreciate cultural heritage 
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Figure 1: Duryodhana, Private Collection, recently  






































178 Verified Complaint, supra note 4, Ex. A at 2. 
  
2014] The Duryodhana Dilemma 279 
 





































179 From Jungle to Museum and Back?, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2013/05/16/arts/design/from-jungle-to-museum-and-back.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/5LTX-FQL5. 
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Figure 3: Bhima, Norton Simon Museum, recently  
repatriated to Cambodia, 10th Century180  
  
 
180 Tom Mashberg & Ralph Blumenthal, Christie’s to Return Cambodian Statue, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/arts/design/christies-to-return-cambodian-
statue.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5WHN-26Y8. 
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Figure 4: Kneeling Attendants, Metropolitan Museum of Art, recently  





181 Tom Mashberg & Ralph Blumenthal, The Met Plans to Return a Pair of Statues to Cambodia, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/arts/design/the-met-to-
return-statues-to-cambodia.html?pagewanted-all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/V4SG-
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